MPRM Group Limited - Network Security

<body topmargin="0" leftmargin="0"> <p align="center"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="2"><a target="_top" href="http://www.mobrien.com/advice1.html">Contact us</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/firewall_r.html">Firewalls</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/windows_nt_wardoc.htm">NT Penetration</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/web.html">Web Services</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/computer_crime.shtml">Computer Crime</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/terminology.shtml">Terminology</a> | <b><a target="_top" href="http://www.mobrien.com/ui.html">Index</a></b></font> <p align="center"><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><img src="mprm_white.gif" border="0" width="300" height="75"></font></b> <p><font face="Verdana" color="#000080" size="4" t ,><i>Investigation Tool: Knowledge</i></font> <p><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><u>Detecting intruders who attack systems through your network.</u></font></b> <p align="left"><font face="Verdana" size="2"><b>Welcome:</b></font> <blockquote> <ul> <li> <p align="left"><font face="Verdana" size="2">A small collection of  <a href="http://library.mobrien.com">free hacker (not cracker) tools</a> is available at our <a href="http://library.mobrien.com">Collingwood server</a> to help you watch your favourite box for intruders. </font></p> <li> <p align="left"><font face="Verdana" size="2">An extensive array of <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/traceroute.html">traceroute facilities</a> is available at out <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/traceroute.html">Mississauga Server</a></font></p> <li> <p align="left"><font face="Verdana" size="2">A comprehensive set of <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/net.shtml">network tools</a> is available at this site including: Subnet Mask Calculator; Network/Node Calculator; IP address Calculator (hex / decimal / binary TCPIP Address); NSLookup; and Traceroute.</font></p> </li> </ul> </blockquote> <p align="left"><font face="Verdana" size="2">We also suggest you check out the latest security releases from  the folllowing:</font> <ul> <li><font face="Verdana" size="2"><a target="_blank" href="http://bach.cis.temple.edu/linux/linux-security/Linux-Alerts/">Linux Security Alert</a> from Linux Emergency Response Team.</font> <li><a target="_blank" href="http://www.microsoft.com/security/"><font face="Verdana" size="2">Microsoft Security Advisor</font></a> <li><a target="_blank" href="http://www.openbsd.org/security.html"><font face="Verdana" size="2">OpenBSD Security Views</font></a> <li><a target="_blank" href="http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/advisories.html"><font face="Verdana" size="2">Silicon Graphics Security Advisories</font></a> <li><a target="_blank" href="http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/securitypub.html"><font face="Verdana" size="2">Sun: Security and Other Public Information</font></a> <li><font face="Verdana" size="2"><a href="http://www.mobrien.com/intruders.shtml">Detecting Intruders</a></font></li> </ul> <p><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">PAGE MENU</font></b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><br> </font><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="2"><a target="_top" href="http://www.mobrien.com/advice1.html">Contact us</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/firewall_r.html">Firewalls</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/windows_nt_wardoc.htm">NT Penetration</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/web.html">Web Services</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/computer_crime.shtml">Computer Crime</a> | <a href="http://www.mobrien.com/terminology.shtml">Terminology</a> | <b><a target="_top" href="http://www.mobrien.com/ui.html">Index</a></b></font> <table cellSpacing="0" cellPadding="0" border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td vAlign="top"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="2">1. <b>Introduction</b><br> - <a href="#1.1">What is a "network intrusion detection system (NIDS)"?</a><br> - <a href="#1.2">Who is misusing the system?</a><br> - <a href="#1.3">How do intruders get into systems?</a><br> - <a href="#1.4">Why can intruders get into systems?</a><br> - <a href="#1.5">How do intruders get passwords?</a><br> - <a href="#1.6">What is a typical intrusion scenario?</a><br> - <a href="#1.7">What are some common "intrusion signatures"?</a><br> - <a href="#1.8">What are some common exploits?</a><br> - <a href="#1.9">What are some common reconnaisance scans?</a><br> - <a href="#1.10">What are some common DoS (Denial of Service) attacks?</a><br> - <a href="#1.11">How much danger from intrusions is there?</a><br> - <a href="#1.12">Where can I find current statistics about intrusions?</a><br> 2. <a href="#2."><b>Architecture</b></a><br> - <a href="#2.1">How are intrusions detected?</a><br> - <a href="#2.2">How does a NIDS match signatures with incoming traffic?</a><br> - <a href="#2.4">What happens after a NIDS detects an attack?</a><br> - <a href="#2.5">What other countermeasures besides IDS are there?</a><br> - <a href="#2.6">Where do I put IDS systems on my network?</a><br> - <a href="#2.7">How does IDS fit with the rest of my security framework?</a><br> 3. <a href="#3."><b>Policy</b></a><br> - <a href="#3.1">How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under WinNT?</a><br> - <a href="#3.2">How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under Win95/Win98?</a><br> - <a href="#3.3">How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under UNIX?</a><br> - <a href="#3.4">How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under Macintosh?</a><br> - <a href="#3.5">How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention for the enterprise?</a><br> - <a href="#3.6">How should I implement intrusion detection my enterprise?</a><br> - <a href="#3.7">What should I do when I've been hacked?</a><br> - <a href="#3.8">How should I respond when somebody tells me they've been hacked from my site?</a><br> - <a href="#3.9">How do I collect enough evidence about the hacker?</a></font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="2">4. <a href="#4."><b>Products</b></a><br> - <a href="#4.1">What freeware/shareware intrusion detection systems are available?</a><br> - <a href="#4.2">What commercial intrusion detection systems are available?</a><br> - <a href="#4.3">What is a "network grep" system?</a><br> - <a href="#4.4">What tools do intruders use to break into my systems?</a><br> - <a href="#4.5">What other free/shareware intrusion detection products should I be aware of?</a><br> 6. <a href="#6."><b>Resources</b></a><br> - <a href="#6.1">Where can I find updates about new security holes?</a><br> - <a href="#6.2">What are some other security and intrusion detection resources?</a><br> - <a href="#6.3">What are some sites that are interesting?</a><br> 7. <a href="#7."><b>IDS and Firewalls</b></a><br> - <a href="#7.2">Why do I need IDS if I already have a firewall?</a><br> - <a href="#7.3">If I have a intrusion detection, do I need firewall?</a><br> - <a href="#7.4">Where does the intrusion detection system gets its information? The firewall?</a><br> 8. <a href="#8."><b>Implementation Guide</b></a><br> - <a href="#8.1">What questions should I ask my IDS vendor?</a><br> - <a href="#8.2">How do I maintain the system on an on-going basis?</a><br> - <a href="#8.4">How do I stop innapropriate web surfing?</a><br> - <a href="#8.5">How can I build my own IDS (writing code)?</a><br> - <a href="#8.7">What is the legality of NIDS (since it is a form of wiretap)?</a><br> - <a href="#8.8">How do I save logfiles in a tamper-proof way?</a><br> 9. <a href="#9"><b>What are the limitations of NIDS?</b></a><br> -<a href="#9.1">Switched network (inherent limitation)</a><br> -<a href="#9.2">Resource limitations</a><br> -<a href="#9.3">Attacks against the NIDS</a><br> -<a href="#9.4">Simple evasion</a><br> -<a href="#9.5">Complex evasion</a><br> -<a href="#9.9">Tools</a><br> 10. <a href="#10."><b>Misc.</b></a><br> - <a href="#10.1">What are some standardization/interoperability efforts?</a><br> 11. <a href="#11."><b>Honeypots and Deception Systems</b></a><br> - <a href="#11.1">What is a honeypot?</a><br> - <a href="#11.2">What are the advantages of a honeypot?</a><br> - <a href="#11.3">What are the disadvantages of a honeypot?</a><br> - <a href="#11.4">How can I setup my own honepot?</a><br> - <a href="#11.5">What are the types of honeypots?</a><br> - <a href="#11.6">What are the pros/cons of setting up a system that can be hacked?</a><br> - <a href="#11.7">Are there examples of people using honeypots?</a><br> - <a href="#11.8">What honeypot products are available?</a><br> - <a href="#11.9">What are deception countermeasures?</a><br> <br> </font></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <dl compact> <dt>  <dt>  <h1><a name="1."><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1. Introduction</font></a></h1> <dd>  <dt>  <h2><a name="1.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.1 What is a "network intrusion detection system (NIDS)"?</font></a></h2> <dd> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">An <b>intrusion</b> is somebody (A.K.A. "hacker" or "cracker") attempting to break into or misuse your system. The word "misuse" is broad, and can reflect something severe as stealing confidential data to something minor such as misusing your email system for spam (though for many of us, that is a major issue!).</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">An "Intrusion Detection System (IDS)" is a system for detecting such intrusions. For the purposes of this FAQ, IDS can be broken down into the following categories:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>network intrusion detection systems (NIDS)</b> monitors packets on the network wire and attempts to discover if a hacker/cracker is attempting to break into a system (or cause a denial of service attack). A typical example is a system that watches for large number of TCP connection requests (SYN) to many different ports on a target machine, thus discovering if someone is attempting a TCP port scan. A NIDS may run either on the target machine who watches its own traffic (usually integrated with the stack and services themselves), or on an independent machine promiscuously watching all network traffic (hub, router, probe). Note that a "network" IDS monitors many machines, whereas the others monitor only a single machine (the one they are installed on).</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>system integrity verifiers (SIV)</b> monitors system files to find when a intruder changes them (thereby leaving behind a backdoor). The most famous of such systems is "Tripwire". A SIV may watch other components as well, such as the Windows registry and chron configuration, in order to find well known signatures. It may also detect when a normal user somehow acquires root/administrator level privleges. Many existing products in this area should be considered more "tools" than complete "systems": i.e. something like "Tripwire" detects changes in critical system components, but doesn't generate real-time alerts upon an intrusion.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>log file monitors (LFM)</b> monitor log files generated by network services. In a similar manner to NIDS, these systems look for patterns in the log files that suggest an intruder is attacking. A typical example would be a parser for HTTP server log files that looking for intruders who try well-known security holes, such as the "phf" attack. Example: swatch</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>deception systems</b> (A.K.A. decoys, lures, fly-traps, honeypots) which contain pseudo-services whose goal is to emulate well-known holes in order to trap hackers. See <i>The Deception ToolKit <a href="http://www.all.net/dtk/">http://www.all.net/dtk/</a></i> for an example. Also, simple tricks by renaming "administrator" account on NT, then setting up a dummy account with no rights by extensive auditing can be used. There is more on "deception" later in this document. Also see <a href="http://www.enteract.com/~lspitz/honeypot.html">http://www.enteract.com/~lspitz/honeypot.html</a></font> <p><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">other</font></b> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">For more info, see <a href="http://www.icsa.net/idswhite/">http://www.icsa.net/idswhite/</a>.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.2 Who is misusing the system?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">There are two words to describe the intruder: <b>hacker</b> and <b>cracker</b>. A hacker is a generic term for a person who likes getting into things. The benign hacker is the person who likes to get into his/her own computer and understand how it works. The malicious hacker is the person who likes getting into other people's systems. The benign hackers wish that the media would stop bad-mouthing all hackers and use the term 'cracker' instead. Unfortunately, this is not likely to happen. In any event, the word used in this FAQ is 'intruder', to generically denote anybody trying to get into your systems.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Intruders can be classified into two categories.</font> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Outsiders</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Intruders from outside your network, and who may attack you external presence (deface web servers, forward spam through email servers, etc.). They may also attempt to go around the firewall to attack machines on the internal network. Outside intruders may come from the <b>Internet</b>, <b>dial-up</b> lines, <b>physical break-ins</b>, or from <b>partner</b> (vendor, customer, reseller, etc.) network that is linked to your corporate network.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Insiders</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Intruders that legitimately use your internal network. These include users who <b>misuse priviledges</b> (such as the Social Security employee who marked someone as being dead because they didn't like that person) or who <b>impersonate</b> higher privileged users (such as using someone else's terminal). A frequently quoted statistic is that 80% of security breaches are committed by insiders.</font></dd> </dl> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">There are several types of intruders <b>Joy riders</b> hack because they can. <b>Vandals</b> are intent on causing destruction or marking up your web-pages. <b>Profiteers</b> are intent on profiting from their enterprise, such as rigging the system to give them money or by stealing corporate data and selling it.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.3 How do intruders get into systems?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The primary ways a intruder can get into a system:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Physical Intrusion</b> If a intruders have physical access to a machine (i.e. they can use the keyboard or take apart the system), they will be able to get in. Techniques range from special privileges the console has, to the ability to physically take apart the system and remove the disk drive (and read/write it on another machine). Even BIOS protection is easy to bypass: virtually all BIOSes have backdoor passwords.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>System Intrusion</b> This type of hacking assumes the intruder already has a low-privilege user account on the system. If the system doesn't have the latest security patches, there is a good chance the intruder will be able to use a known exploit in order to gain additional administrative privileges.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Remote Intrusion</b> This type of hacking involves a intruder who attempts to penetrate a system remotely across the network. The intruder begins with no special privileges. There are several forms of this hacking. For example, a intruder has a much more difficult time if there exists a firewall on between him/her and the victim machine.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Note that Network Intrusion Detection Systems are primarily concerned with Remote Intrusion.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.4 Why can intruders get into systems?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Software always has bugs. System Administrators and Programmers can never track down and eliminate all possible holes. Intruders have only to find one hole to break in.</font> <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.4.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.4.1 Software bugs</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Software bugs are exploited in the server daemons, the client applications, the operating system, and the network stack. Software bugs can be classified in the following manner:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Buffer overflows:</b> Almost all the security holes you read about in the press are due to this problem. A typical example is a programmer who sets aside 256 characters to hold a login username. Surely, the programmer thinks, nobody will ever have a name longer than that. But a hacker thinks, what happens if I enter in a false username longer than that? Where do the additional characters go? If they hackers do the job just right, they can send 300 characters, including code that will be executed by the server, and voila, they've broken in. Hackers find these bugs in several ways. First of all, the source code for a lot of services is available on the net. Hackers routinely look through this code searching for programs that have buffer overflow problems. Secondly, hackers may look at the programs themselves to see if such a problem exists, though reading assembly output is really difficult. Thirdly, hackers will examine every place the program has input and try to overflow it with random data. If the program crashes, there is a good chance that carefully constructed input will allow the hacker to break in. Note that this problem is common in programs written in C/C++, but rare in programs written in Java.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Unexpected combinations:</b> Programs are usually constructed using many layers of code, including the underlying operating system as the bottom most layer. Intruders can often send input that is meaningless to one layer, but meaningful to another layer. The most common language for processing user input on the web is PERL. Programs written in PERL will usually send this input to other programs for further evaluation. A common hacking technique would be to enter something like "<code>| mail < /etc/passwd</code>". This gets executed because PERL asks the operating system to launch an additional programme with that input. However, the operating system intercepts the pipe '|' character and launches the 'mail' programme as well, which causes the password file to be emailed to the intruder.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Unhandled input:</b> Most programs are written to handle valid input. Most programmers do not consider what happens when somebody enters input that doesn't match the specification.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Race conditions:</b> Most systems today are "multitasking/multithreaded". This means that they can execute more than one programme at a time. There is a danger if two programs need to access the same data at the same time. Imagine two programs, A and B, who need to modify the same file. In order to modify a file, each programme must first read the file into memory, change the contents in memory, then copy the memory back out into the file. The race condition occurs when programme A reads the file into memory, then makes the change. However, before A gets to write the file, programme B steps in and does the full read/modify/write on the file. Now programme A writes its copy back out to the file. Since programme A started with a copy before B made its changes, all of B's changes will be lost. Since you need to get the sequence of events in just the right order, race conditions are very rare. Intruders usually have to tries thousands of time before they get it right, and hack into the system.</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.4.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.4.2 System configuration</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">System configuration bugs can be classified in the following manner:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Default configurations:</b> Most systems are shipped to customers with default, easy-to-use configurations. Unfortunately, "easy-to-use" means "easy-to-break-in". Almost any UNIX or WinNT machine shipped to you can be hacked in easily.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Lazy administrators:</b> A surprising number of machines are configured with an empty root/administrator password. This is because the administrator is too lazy to configure one right now and wants to get the machine up and running quickly with minimal fuss. Unfortunately, they never get around to fixing the password later, allowing intruders easy access. One of the first things a intruder will do on a network is to scan all machines for empty passwords.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Hole creation:</b> Virtually all programs can be configured to run in a non-secure mode. Sometimes administrators will inadvertently open a hole on a machine. Most administration guides will suggest that administrators turn off everything that doesn't absolutely positively need to run on a machine in order to avoid accidental holes. Note that security auditing packages can usually find these holes and notify the administrator.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Trust relationships:</b> Intruders often "island hop" through the network exploiting trust relationships. A network of machines trusting each other is only as secure as its weakest link.</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.4.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.4.3 Password cracking</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This is a special category all to itself.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Really weak passwords:</b> Most people use the names of themselves, their children, spouse/SO, pet, or car model as their password. Then there are the users who choose "password" or simply nothing. This gives a list of less than 30 possibilities that a intruder can type in for themselves.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Dictionary attacks:</b> Failing the above attack, the intruder can next try a "dictionary attack". In this attack, the intruder will use a programme that will try every possible word in the dictionary. Dictionary attacks can be done either by repeatedly logging into systems, or by collecting encrypted passwords and attempting to find a match by similarly encrypting all the passwords in the dictionary. Intruders usually have a copy of the English dictionary as well as foreign language dictionaries for this purpose. They all use additional dictionary-like databases, such as names (see above) and lists of common passwords.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Brute force attacks:</b> Similar to a Dictionary attack, a intruder may try all possible combinations of characters. A short 4-letter password consisting of lower-case letters can be cracked in just a few minutes (roughly, half a million possible combinations). A long 7-character password consisting of upper and lower case, as well as numbers and punctuation (10 trillion combinations) can take months to crack assuming you can try a million combinations a second (in practice, a thousand combinations per second is more likely for a single machine).</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.4.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.4.4 Sniffing unsecured traffic</font></a></h3> <dd> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Shared medium:</b> On traditional Ethernet, all you have to do is put a Sniffer on the wire to see all the traffic on a segment. This is getting more difficult now that most corporations are transitioning to switched Ethernet.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Server sniffing:</b> However, on switched networks, if you can install a sniffing programme on a server (especially one acting as a router), you can probably use that information to break into client machines and trusted machines as well. For example, you might not know a user's password, but sniffing a Telnet session when they log in will give you that password.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Remote sniffing:</b> A large number of boxes come with RMON enabled and public community strings. While the bandwidth is really low (you can't sniff all the traffic), it presents interesting possibilities.</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.4.5"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.4.5 Design flaws</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Even if a software implementation is completely correct according to the design, there still may be bugs in the design itself that leads to intrusions.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>TCP/IP protocol flaws:</b> The TCP/IP protocool was designed before we had much experience with the wide-scale hacking we see today. As a result, there are a number of design flaws that lead to possible security problems. Some examples include smurf attacks, ICMP Unreachable disconnects, IP spoofing, and SYN floods. The biggest problem is that the IP protocol itself is very "trusting": hackers are free to forge and change IP data with impunity. IPsec (IP security) has been designed to overcome many of these flaws, but it is not yet widely used.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>UNIX design flaws:</b> There are number of inherent flaws in the UNIX operating system that frequently lead to intrusions. The chief problem is the access control system, where only 'root' is granted administrative rights. As a result,</font></p> </dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.5"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.5 How do intruders get passwords?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Intruders get passwords in the following ways:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Clear-text sniffing:</b> A number of protocols (Telnet, FTP, HTTP Basic) use clear-text passwords, meaning that they are not encrypted as the go over the wire between the client and the server. A intruder with a protocol analyzer can watch the wire looking for such passwords. No further effort is needed; the intruder can start immediately using those passwords to log in.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Encrypted sniffing:</b> Most protocols, however, use some sort of encryption on the passwords. In these cases, the intruder will need to carry out a Dictionary or Brute Force attack on the password in order to attempt decryption. Note that you still don't know about the intruder's presence, as he/she has been completely passive and has not transmitted anything on the wire. Password cracking does not require anything to be sent on the wire as intruder's own machine is being used to authenticate your password.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Replay attack:</b> In some cases, intruders do not need to decrypt the password. They can use the encrypted form instead in order to login to systems. This usually requires reprogramming their client software in order to make use of the encrypted password.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Password file stealing:</b> The entire user database is usually stored in a single file on the disk. In UNIX, this file is <code>/etc/passwd</code> (or some mirror of that file), and under WinNT, this is the SAM file. Either way, once a intruder gets hold of this file, he/she can run cracking programs (described above) in order to find some weak passwords within the file.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Observation:</b> One of the traditional problems in password security is that passwords must be long and difficult to guess (in order to make Dictionary and Brute Force cracks unreasonably difficult). However, such passwords are often difficult to remember, so users write them down somewhere. Intruders can often search a persons work site in order to find passwords written on little pieces of paper (usually under the keyboard). Intruders can also train themselves to watch typed in passwords behind a user's back.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Social Engineering:</b> A common (successful) technique is to simply call the user and say "Hi, this is Bob from MIS. We're trying to track down some problems on the network and they appear to be coming from your machine. What password are you using?" Many users will give up their password in this situation. (Most corporations have a policy where they tell users to never give out their password, even to their own MIS departments, but this technique is still successful. One easy way around this is for MIS to call the new employee 6-months have being hired and ask for their password, then criticize them for giving it to them in a manner they will not forget :-)</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.6"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.6 What is a typical intrusion scenario?</font></a></h2> <dd> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A typical scenario might be:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Step 1: <b>outside reconnaissance</b> The intruder will find out as much as possible without actually giving themselves away. They will do this by finding public information or appearing as a normal user. In this stage, you really can't detect them. The intruder will do a 'whois' lookup to find as much information as possible about your network as registered along with your Domain Name (such as <code>foobar.com</code>. The intruder might walk through your DNS tables (using 'nslookup', 'dig', or other utilities to do domain transfers) to find the names of your machines. The intruder will browse other public information, such as your public web sites and anonymous FTP sites. The intruder might search news articles and press releases about your company.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Step 2: <b>inside reconnaisance</b> The intruder uses more invasive techniques to scan for information, but still doesn't do anything harmful. They might walk through all your web pages and look for CGI scripts (CGI scripts are often easily hacked). They might do a 'ping' sweep in order to see which machines are alive. They might do a UDP/TCP scan/strobe on target machines in order to see what services are available. They'll run utilities like 'rcpinfo', 'showmount', 'snmpwalk', etc. in order to see what's available. At this point, the intruder has done 'normal' activity on the network and has not done anything that can be classified as an intrusion. At this point, a NIDS will be able to tell you that "somebody is checking door handles", but nobody has actually tried to open a door yet.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Step 3: <b>exploit</b> The intruder crosses the line and starts exploiting possible holes in the target machines. The intruder may attempt to compromise a CGI script by sending shell commands in input fields. The intruder might attempt to exploit well-known buffer-overrun holes by sending large amounts of data. The intruder may start checking for login accounts with easily guessable (or empty) passwords. The hacker may go through several stages of exploits. For example, if the hacker was able to access a user account, they will now attempt further exploits in order to get root/admin access.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Step 4: <b>foot hold</b> At this stage, the hacker has successfully gained a foot hold in your network by hacking into a machine. The intruder's main goal is to hide evidence of the attacks (doctoring the audit trail and log files) and make sure they can get back in again. They may install 'toolkits' that give them access, replace existing services with their own Trojan horses that have backdoor passwords, or create their own user accounts. System Integrity Verifiers (SIVs) can often detect an intruder at this point by noting the changed system files. The hacker will then use the system as a stepping stone to other systems, since most networks have fewer defences from inside attacks.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Step 5: <b>profit</b> The intruder takes advantage of their status to steal confidential data, misuse system resources (i.e. stage attacks at other sites from your site), or deface web pages.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Another scenario starts differently. Rather than attack a specific site, and intruder might simply scan random internet addresses looking for a specific hole. For example, an intruder may attempt to scan the entire Internet for machines that have the SendMail DEBUG hole. They simply exploit such machines that they find. They don't target you directly, and they really won't even know who you are. (This is known as a 'birthday attack'; given a list of well-known security holes and a list of IP addresses, there is a good chance that there exists some machine somewhere that has one of those holes).</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.7"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.7 What are some common "intrusion signatures"?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">There are three types of attacks:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>reconnaisance</b> These include ping sweeps, DNS zone transfers, email recons, TCP or UDP port scans, and possibly indexing of public web servers to find cgi holes.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>exploits</b> Intruders will take advantage of hidden features or bugs to gain access to the system.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>denial-of-service (DoS) attacks</b> Where the intruder attempts to crash a service (or the machine), overload network links, overloaded the CPU, or fill up the disk. The intruder is not trying to gain information, but to simply act as a vandal to prevent you from making use of your machine.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.8"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8 What are some common exploits?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.1 CGI scripts</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CGI programs are notoriously insecure. Typical security holes include passing tainted input directly to the command shell via the use of shell metacharacters, using hidden variables specifying any filename on the system, and otherwise revealing more about the system than is good. The most well-known CGI bug is the 'phf' library shipped with NCSA httpd. The 'phf' library is supposed to allow server-parsed HTML, but can be exploited to give back any file. Other well-known CGI scripts that an intruder might attempt to exploit are: TextCounter, GuestBook, EWS, info2www, Count.cgi, handler, webdist.cgi, php.cgi, files.pl, nph-test-cgi, nph-publish, AnyForm, FormMail. If you see somebody trying to access one or all of these CGI scripts (and you don't use them), then it is clear indication of an intrusion attempt (assuming you don't have a version installed that you actually want to use).</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.2 Web server attacks</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Beyond the execution of CGI programs, web servers have other possible holes. A large number of self-written web servers (include IIS 1.0 and NetWare 2.x) have hole whereby a file name can include a series of "../" in the path name to move elsewhere in the file system, getting any file. Another common bug is buffer overflow in the request field or in one of the other HTTP fields.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Web server often have bugs related to their interaction with the underlying <b>operating system</b>. An old hole in Microsoft IIS have been dealing with the fact that files have two names, a long filename and a short 8.3 hashed equivalent that could sometimes be accessed bypassing permissions. NTFS (the new file system) has a feature called "alternate data streams" that is similar to the Macintosh data and resource forks. You could access the file through its stream name by appending "::$DATA" in order to see a script rather than run it.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Servers have long had problems with <b>URLs</b>. For example, the "death by a thousand slashes" problem in older Apache would cause huge CPU loads as it tried to process each directory in a thousand slash URL.</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.3 Web browser attacks</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">It seems that all of Microsoft's and Netscape's web browsers have security holes (though, of course, the latest ones never have any that we know about -- yet). This includes both URL, HTTP, HTML, JavaScript, Frames, Java, and ActiveX attacks.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>URL</b> fields can cause a buffer overflow condition, either as it is parsed in the HTTP header, as it is displayed on the screen, or processed in some form (such as saved in the cache history). Also, an old bug with Internet Explorer allowed interaction with a bug whereby the browser would execute .LNK or .URL commands.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>HTTP</b> headers can be used to exploit bugs because some fields are passed to functions that expect only certain information.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>HTML</b> can be often exploited, such as the MIME-type overflow in Netscape Communicator's <EMBED> command.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>JavaScript</b> is a perennial favorite, and usually tries to exploit the "file upload" function by generating a filename and automatically hidden the "SUBMIT" button. There have been many variations of this bug fixed, then new ways found to circumvent the fixes.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Frames</b> are often used as part of a JavaScript or Java hack (for example, hiding web-pages in 1px by 1px sized screens), but they present special problems. For example, I can include a link to a trustworthy site that uses frames, then replace some of those frames with web pages from my own site, and they will appear to you to be part of that remote site.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Java</b> has a robust security model, but that model has proven to have the occasional bug (though compared to everything else, it has proven to be one of the most secure elements of the whole system). Moreover, its robust security may be its undoing: Normal Java applets have no access to the local system, but sometimes they would be more useful if they did have local access. Thus, the implementation of "trust" models that can more easily be hacked.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>ActiveX</b> is even more dangerous than Java as it works purely from a trust model and runs native code. You can even inadvertently catch a virus that was accidentally imbedded in some vendor's code.</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.4 SMTP (SendMail) attacks</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">SendMail is an extremely complicated and widely used program, and as a consequence, has been the frequent source of security holes. In the old days (of the '88 Morris Worm), hackers would take advantage of a hole in the DEBUG command or the hidden WIZ feature to break into SMTP. These days, they often try buffer overruns. SMTP also can be exploited in reconnaissance attacks, such as using the VRFY command to find user names.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.5"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.5 Access</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Failed login attempts, failed file access attempts, password cracking, administrative powers abuse</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.6"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.6 IMAP</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Users retrieve email from servers via the IMAP protocol (in contrast, SMTP transfers email between servers). Hackers have found a number of bugs in several popular IMAP servers.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.7"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.7 IP spoofing</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">There is a range of attacks that take advantage of the ability to forge (or 'spoof') your IP address. While a source address is sent along with every IP packet, it isn't actually used for routing. This means an intruder can pretend to be you when talking to a server. The intruder never sees the response packets (although your machine does, but throws them away because they don't match any requests you've sent). The intruder won't get data back this way, but can still send commands to the server pretending to be you.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">IP spoofing is frequently used as part of other attacks:</font> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">SMURF</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Where the source address of a broadcast ping is forged so that a huge number of machines respond back to victim indicated by the address, overloading it (or its link).</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">TCP sequence number prediction</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">In the startup of a TCP connection, you must choose a sequence number for your end, and the server must choose a sequence number for its end. Older TCP stacks choose predictable sequence numbers, allowing intruders to create TCP connections from a forged IP address (for which they will never see the response packets) that presumably will bypass security.</font> <dt><b><a name="DNSsequencespoof"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS poisoning through sequence prediction</font></a></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS servers will "recursively" resolve DNS names. Thus, the DNS server that satisfies a client request will become itself a client to the next server in the recursive chain. The sequence numbers it uses are predictable. Thus, an intruder can send a request to the DNS server and a response to the server forged to be from the next server in the chain. It will then believe the forged response, and use that to satisfy other clients.</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.8"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.8 Buffer Overflows</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Some other buffer overflow attacks are:</font> <dl> <dt><b><a name="DNSoverflow"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS overflow</font></a></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Where an overly long DNS name is sent to a server. DNS names are limited to 64-bytes per subcomponent and 256-bytes overall.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">statd overflow</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">where an overly long filename is provided</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.8.9"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.8.9 DNS attacks</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS is a prime target because if you can corrupt the DNS server, you can take advantage of trust relationships.</font> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS cache poisoning</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Every DNS packet contains a "Question" section and "Answer" section. Vulnerable servers will believe (and cache) Answers that you send along with Questions. Most, but not all, DNS servers have been patched as of November, 1998.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS poisoning through sequence prediction</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">See <a href="#DNSsequencespoof">above</a></font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">DNS overflow</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">See <a href="#DNSoverflow">above</a></font></dd> </dl> </dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.9"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.9 What are some common reconnaisance scans?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.9.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.9.1 Ping sweeps</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This simple scan simply pings a range of IP addresses to find which machines are alive. Note that more sophisticated scanners will use other protocols (such as an SNMP sweep) to do the same thing.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.9.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.9.2 TCP scans</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Probes for open (listening) TCP ports looking for services the intruder can exploit. Scans can use normal TCP connections or stealth scans that use half-open connections (to prevent them from being logged) or FIN scans (never opens a port, but tests if someone's listening). Scans can be either sequential, randomized, or configured lists of ports.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.9.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.9.3 UDP scans</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">These scans are a little bit more difficult because UDP is a connectionless protocol. The technique is to send a garbage UDP packet to the desired port. Most machines will respond with an ICMP "destination port unreachable" message, indicating that no service is listening at that port. However, many machines throttle ICMP messages, so you can't do this very fast.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.9.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.9.4 OS identification</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">By sending illegal (or strange) ICMP or TCP packets, an intruder can identify the operating system. Standards usually state how machines should respond to legal packets, so machines tend to be uniform in their response to valid input. However, standards omit (usually intentionally) the response to invalid input. Thus, each operating system's unique responses to invalid inputs forms a signature that hackers can use to figure out what the target machine is. This type of activity occurs at a low level (like stealth TCP scans) that systems do not log.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.9.5"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.9.5 Account scans</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Tries to log on with accounts</font> <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Accounts with no passwords</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Accounts with password same as username, or "password".</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Default accounts that were shipped with the product (a common problem on SGI, done to make setup easier)</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Accounts installed with software products (common on Microsoft as well as Unix, caused by products that run under their own special user account).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Anonymous FTP problems (CWD ~root)</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Scan for rlogin/rsh/rexec ports, that may supported trusted logins.</font></li> </ul> </dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.10"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.10 What are some common DoS (Denial of Service) attacks?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.10.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.10.1 Ping-of-Death</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Sends an invalid fragment, which starts before the end of packet, but extends past the end of the packet.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.10.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.10.2 SYN Flood</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Sends TCP SYN packet (which start connections) very fast, leaving the victim waiting to complete a huge number of connections, causing it to run out of resources and dropping legitimate connections. A new defence against this are "SYN cookies". Each side of a connection has its own sequence-number. In response to a SYN, the attacked machine creates a special sequence number that is a "cookie" of the connection then forgets everything it knows about the connection. It can then recreate the forgotten information about the connection when the next packets come in from a legitimate connection.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.10.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.10.3 Land/Latierra</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Sends forged SYN packet with identical source/destination address/port so that system goes into infinite loop trying to complete the TCP connection.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="1.10.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.10.4 WinNuke</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Sends OOB/URG data on a TCP connection to port 139 (NetBIOS Session/SMB), which cause the Windows system to hang.</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.11"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.11 How much danger from intrusions is there?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">I frequently hear from people the statement "There's nothing on the system that anybody would want anyway". I walk them through various scenarios, such as simple ones if they've ever paid for anything on-line with a credit card or if they have any financial records or social security number on their personal machine.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">More importantly, there is the issue of legal liability. You are potentially liable for damages caused by a hacker using your machine. You must be able to prove to a court that you took "reasonable" measures to defend yourself from hackers. For example, consider if you put a machine on a fast link (cable modem or DSL) and left administrator/root accounts open with no password. Then if a hacker breaks into that machine, then uses that machine to break into a bank, you may be held liable because you did not take the most obvious measures in securing the machine.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">There is a good paper <i><a target="_blank" href="http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html">http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html</a></i> by John D. Howard that discusses how much hacking goes on over the Internet, and how much danger you are in.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="1.12"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1.12 Where can I find current statistics about intrusions?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CyberNotes by NIPC (<a href="http://www.fbi.gov/nipc/welcom.htm">http://www.fbi.gov/nipc/welcome.htm</a>)</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CyberNotes is published every two weeks by the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). Its mission is to support security and information system professionals with timely information on cyber vulnerabilities, hacker exploit scripts, hacker trends, virus information, and other critical infrastructure-related best practices.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The NIPC was set up by the FBI in mid 1998, and its first major activity was to help track down the source of the Melissa virus (W97M.Melissa). The CyberNotes archive goes back to January 1999.</font></p> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">AusCERT Consolidated Statistics Project (<a href="http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/acsp/index.html">http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/acsp/index.html</a>)</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A project to collect intrusion statistics from around the web and consolidate them. They want people to join and send them info.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">An Analysis Of Security Incidents On The Internet 1989 - 1995 (<a href="http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html">http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html</a>)</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A dissertation by John D. Howard, Carnegie Mellon University</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CERT Reports, Articles, and Presentations (<a href="http://www.cert.org/nav/reports.html">http://www.cert.org/nav/reports.html</a>)</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CERT has a number of historical statistics on intrusions, but they aren't nearly as up-to-date as the NIPC.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">1999 CSI-DBI Survey (<a href="http://www.gocsi.com/summary.htm">http://www.gocsi.com/summary.htm</a>) or (<a href="http://www.gocsi.com/prelea990301.htm">http://www.gocsi.com/prelea990301.htm</a></font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CSI (Computer Security Institute) does a number of surveys about intrusions and security</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h1><a name="2."><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2. Architecture</font></a></h1> <dd>  <dt>  <h2><a name="2.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.1 How are intrusions detected?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.1.1 Anomaly detection</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The most common way people approach network intrusion detection is to detect statistical anomalies. The idea behind this approach is to measure a "baseline" of such stats as CPU utilization, disk activity, user logins, file activity, and so forth. Then, the system can trigger when there is a deviation from this baseline.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The benefit of this approach is that it can detect the anomalies without having to understand the underlying cause behind the anomalies.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">For example, let's say that you monitor the traffic from individual workstations. Then, the system notes that at 2am, a lot of these workstations start logging into the servers and carrying out tasks. This is something interesting to note and possibly take action on.</font></p> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.1.2 Signature recognition</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The majority of commercial products are based upon examining the traffic looking for well-known patterns of attack. This means that for every hacker technique, the engineers code something into the system for that technique.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This can be as simple as a pattern match. The classic example is to example every packet on the wire for the pattern "/cgi-bin/phf?", which might indicate somebody attempting to access this vulnerable CGI script on a web-server. Some IDS systems are built from large databases that contain hundreds (or thousands) of such strings. They just plug into the wire and trigger on every packet they see that contains one of these strings.</font></p> </dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="2.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.2 How does a NIDS match signatures with incoming traffic?</font></a></h2> <dd> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Traffic consists of IP datagrams flowing across a network. A NIDS is able to capture those packets as they flow by on the wire. A NIDS consists of a special TCP/IP stack that reassembles IP datagrams and TCP streams. It then applies some of the following techniques:</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Protocol stack verification</b> A number of intrusions, such as "Ping-O-Death" and "TCP Stealth Scanning" use violations of the underlying IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols in order to attack the machine. A simple verification system can flag invalid packets. This can include valid, by suspicious, behavior such as severally fragmented IP packets.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Application protocol verification</b> A number of intrusions use invalid protocol behavior, such as "WinNuke", which uses invalid NetBIOS protocol (adding OOB data) or DNS cache poisoning, which has a valid, but unusually signature. In order to effectively detect these intrusions, a NIDS must re-implement a wide variety of application-layer protocols in order to detect suspicious or invalid behavior.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Creating new loggable events</b> A NIDS can be used to extend the auditing capabilities of your network management software. For example, a NIDS can simply log all the application layer protocols used on a machine. Downstream event log systems (WinNT Event, UNIX syslog, SNMP TRAPS, etc.) can then correlate these extended events with other events on the network.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="2.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.4 What happens after a NIDS detects an attack?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Reconfigure firewall</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Configure the firewall to filter out the IP address of the intruder. However, this still allows the intruder to attack from other addresses. Checkpoint firewall's support a "Suspicious Activity Monitoring Protocol (SAMP)" for configuring firewalls. Checkpoint has their "OPSEC" standard for re-configuring firewalls to block the offending IP address.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">chime</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Beep or play a .WAV file. For example, you might hear a recording "You are under attack".</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">SNMP Trap</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Send an SNMP Trap datagram to a management console like HP OpenView, Tivoli, Cabletron Spectrum, etc.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">NT Event</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Send an event to the WinNT event log.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">syslog</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Send an event to the UNIX syslog event system.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">send email</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Send email to an administrator to notify of the attack.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">page</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Page (using normal pagers) the system administrator.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Log the attack</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Save the attack information (timestamp, intruder IP address, victim IP address/port, protocol information).</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Save evidence</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Save a tracefile of the raw packets for later analysis.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Launch program</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Launch a separate programme to handle the event.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Terminate the TCP session</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Forge a TCP FIN packet to force a connection to terminate.</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="2.5"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.5 What other countermeasures besides IDS are there?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Firewalls</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Most people think of the firewall as their first line of defence. This means if intruders figure out how to bypass it (easy, especially since most intrusions are committed by employees inside the firewall), they will have free run of the network. A better approach is to think of it as the <i>last</i> line of defence: you should be pretty sure machines are configured right and intrusion detection is operating, and then place the firewall up just to avoid the wannabe script-kiddies. Note that almost any router these days can be configured with some firewall filtering. While firewalls protect external access, they leave the network unprotected from internal intrusions. It has been estimated that 80% of losses due to "hackers" have been internal attacks.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">authentication</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">You should run scanners that automated the finding of open accounts. You should enforce automatically strict policies for passwords (7 character minimum, including numbers, dual-case, and punctuation) using crack or built in policy checkers (WinNT native, add-on for UNIX). You can also consider single-sign on products and integrating as many password systems as you can, such as RADIUS/TACACS integration with UNIX or NT (for dial-up style login), integrating UNIX <i>and</i> WinNT authentication (with existing tools are the new Kerberos in Windows 2000). These authentication systems will help you also remove "clear-text" passwords from protocols such as Telnet, FTP, IMAP, POP, etc.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">VPNs (Virtual Private Networks)</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">VPNs create a secure connection over the Internet for remote access (e.g. for telecomuters). Example #1: Microsoft includes a a technology called PPTP (PPP over TCP) built into Windows. This gives a machine two IP addresses, one on the Internet, and a virtual one on the corporate network. Example #2: IPsec enhances the traditional IP protocol with security. While VPN vendors claim their product "enhance security", the reality is that they decrease corporate security. While the pipe itself is secure (authenticated, encrypted), either ends of the pipe are wide open. A home machine compromised with a backdoor rootkit allows a hacker to subvert the VPN connection, allow full, undetectable access to the other side of the firewall.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">encryption</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Encryption is becoming increasingly popular. You have your choice of email encryption (PGP, SMIME), file encryption (PGP again), or file system encryption (BestCrypt, PGP again).</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">lures/honeypots</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Programs that pretend to be a service, but which do not advertise themselves. It can be something as simple as one of the many BackOrifice emulators (such as NFR's Back Officer Friendly), or as complex as an entire subnet of bogus systems installed for that purpose.</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="2.6"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.6 Where do I put IDS systems on my network?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">network hosts</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Even though network intrusion detection systems have traditionally been used as probes, they can also be placed on hosts (in non-promiscuous mode). Take for example a switched network where an employee is on the same switch as the CEO, who runs Win98. The windows machine is completely defenceless, and has no logging capabilities that could be fed to a traditional host-based intrusion detection system. The employee could run a network-based password cracker for months without fear of being caught. A NIDS installed like virus scanning software is the most effective way to detect such intrusions.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">network perimeter</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">IDS is most effective on the network perimeter, such as on both sides of the <b>firewall</b>, near the <b>dial-up</b> server, and on links to <b>partner</b> networks. These links tend to be low-bandwidth (T1 speeds) such that an IDS can keep up with the traffic.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">WAN backbone</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Another high-value point is the corporate WAN backbone. A frequent problem is hacking from "outlying" areas to the main corporate network. Since WAN links tend to be low bandwidth, IDS systems can keep up.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">server farms</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Serves are often placed on their own network, connected to switches. The problem these servers have, though, is that IDS systems cannot keep up with high-volume traffic. For extremely important servers, you may be able to install dedicate IDS systems that monitor just the individual server's link. Also, application servers tend to have lower traffic than file servers, so they are better targets for IDS systems.</font> <dt><b><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">LAN backbones</font></b> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">IDS systems are impractical for LAN backbones, because of their high traffic requirements. Some vendors are incorporating IDS detection into switches. A full IDS system that must reassemble packets is unlikely to keep up. A scaled-down system that detects simpler attacks but can keep up is likely to be a better choice.</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="2.7"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.7 How does IDS fit with the rest of my security framework?</font></a></h2> <dd> <ol> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Put firewalls between areas of the network with different security requirements (i.e. between internet-localnet, between users-servers, between company-parterns, etc).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Use network vulnerability scanners to double check firewalls and to find holes that intruders can exploit.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Use host policy scanners to make sure they conform to accepted practices (i.e. latest patches).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Use <b>Network intrusion detection systems</b> and other packet sniffing utilities to see what is actually going on.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Use <b>host-based intrusion detection systems</b> and virus scanners to flag successful intrusions.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Create an easy to follow policy that clearly states the response to intrusions.</font></li> </ol> <dt>  <h2><a name="2.8"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">2.8 How can I detect if someone is running a NIDS?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A NIDS is essentially a sniffer, so therefore standard sniffer detection techniques can be used. Such techniques are explained in <a href="http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html#detect">http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html#detect</a>.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">An example would be to do a traceroute against the victim. This will often generate a low-level event in the IDS. Traceroutes are harmless and frequent on the net, so they don't indicate an attack. However, since many attacks are preceded by traceroutes, IDSs will log them anyway. As part of the logging system, it will usually do a reverse-DNS lookup. Therefore, if you run your own DNS server, then you can detect when somebody is doing a reverse-DNS lookup on your IP address in response to your traceroute.</font></p> <dt>  <h1><a name="3."><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3. Policy</font></a></h1> <dd>  <dt>  <h2><a name="3.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.1 How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under WinNT?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The following lists items that make WinNT more secure, including detection as well as prevention. These are roughly listed in order of importance.</font> <ol> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Install the latest service packs and "hot fixes". These are listed at <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/security/">http://www.microsoft.com/security/</a>. If you are using WinNT 4.0 and you don't have Service Pack #3 (SP3) installed, an intruder can break into your system.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">INSTALLATION: Use NTFS instead of FAT. NTFS allows permissions to be set on a per-file/per-directory basis. NTFS also allows auditing on a per-file/per-directory basis. Note that many people recommend using FAT as the boot drive and NTFS for all other drives (due to the ease-of-use in using DOS to fix things on a FAT drive). However, using NTFS for all drives is definitely more secure.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">USRMGR: Rename the "administrator" account. A common attack is to use a Dictionary or brute force attack on the "administrator" account. Normal accounts can be configured to automatically (and temporarily) "lock out" after a few failed password attempts. However, this feature isn't possible for the administrator account because this allows a denial of service attack (i.e. prevent administration of the machine by locking out the administrator account).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">USRMGR: Create a new account named "administrator" for detecting intrusion attempts.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">USRMGR: Disable the "guest" account. You may also want to rename this account as (much like "administrator"). Once you've renamed the "guest" account, you may want to create a new account named "guest" for detecting hacking attempts.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">NTFS: Disable "write" access for "Everyone" on the <code>%systemroot%/system32</code> directory.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">REGEDT32: Turn on auditing for "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security" in order to detect remote registry browsing.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">INSTALLATION: Do not install in "C:\WINNT" directory. Sometimes intruders will be able to access files if they know the filename; installing in some other directory prevents a priori knowledge. Better yet, install in C:\WINNT, then reinstall in some other directory, then turn auditing on within that directory to alert you to people accessing those older files.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">INSTALLATION: Use the boot partition only for booting and for system files. Put data and applications on a separate partition. It is also a good idea to separate applications from data.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CONTROLPANEL: Enable "Password Protected" on the screensaver. The best screensaver is "Blank Screen". You would think that screensavers run at idle priority, but this isn't always the case, so you can increase the performance of your server by using "Blank Screen". Also, this will reduce power consumption in monitors, especially those that can detect a blank screen and turn themselves off. Finally, some screensavers (i.e. PointCast) are probably hackable.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">REGEDT32: Turn off automatic sharing of ADMIN$, C$, D$, etc. via the "AutoShare" parameter in the registry. This parameter is under "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters", and is "AutoShareServer" for WinNT Server or "AutoShareWks" for WinNT Workstation. This is a DWORD, with a value of '1' for enabled (default), or a value of '0' for disabled. You will have to add the value yourself because it doesn't already exist in the registry.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">REGEDT32: Turn of account/share information via anonymous access. Add "RestrictAnonymous" DWORD with a value of "1" to the registry key "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA" Note that if you see an error "Could not find domain controller for this domain." while setting domain trust relationships, you may have to change it back.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">USRMGR: If you are using Domains (rather than Workgroups), change the user right "Access this computer from the network" to "Authenticated Users" rather than "Everyone". This disables remote access via local accounts on your machine, and allows only access through domain accounts.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">PASSPROP: Enable lockout of the "administrator" account for remote access. This enables the situation where the remote intruder fails to guess the correct password after three tries. After lock-out, the administrator can only log in locally at the system console. You can also disable remote administrator access completely in USRMGR by removing the right "Access this computer from the network" from "Administrators", but this disables all remote administration, which make administration too difficult in a large WinNT environment.</font></li> </ol> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Also consider physical intrusion prevention network wide. John Kozubik suggests using login scripts to force the built-in password protected screen-saver. In the login script, include the line like:</font> <pre><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"> regedit /s \\MY_PDC\netlogon\scrn.reg </font></pre> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">And in the file "scrn.reg", put the text:</font> <pre><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"> REGEDIT4 [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop] "ScreenSaveTimeOut"="1800" "ScreenSaveActive"="1" "SCRNSAVE.EXE"="c:\winnt\system32\logon.scr" "ScreenSaverIsSecure"="1" </font></pre> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This will trigger the password prompt to appear 30-minutes after a user is away from the desktop (it doesn't log them out; just forces them to re-enter the password before they have access again).</font> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.2 How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under Win95/Win98?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This section assumes you are a home user using Win95/Win98 to access the Internet. Win95/Win98 has no auditing or logging capabilities; you really should upgrade to WinNT if you are using the system for any serious purpose.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The following are techniques for the typical user:</font> <ol> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Install the latest patches (of course).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Turn off print sharing. When print sharing is turned on, the system creates a PRINTER$ share that allows remote systems to access printer drivers from the local system32 directory. Unfortunately, this allows remote systems to access non-driver files, such as the Win95 password file (combined with other Win95 bugs).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Turn off file sharing. As a home user, you probably don't need it. If you must share files, make sure that you choose a strong password, and only turn it on for brief moments while you need to share the files, then turn it off again.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">(more forthcoming)</font></li> </ol> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">John Kozubik suggests the following techniques for corporate users (who presumably run login scripts from the servers). Since Win95/Win98 is so vulnerable, they provide easy penetration to the rest of the corporate environment. Win95 caches passwords in easy-to-read formats, so you want to remove them.</font> <dl> <dt><code><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">del c:\windows\*.pwl</font></code> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The password cache file will be the first one intruders look for. It has the same name as the user name, and poorly encrypts the cached passwords. Beware that this deletes dial-up passwords as well, so users that bring their notebooks into work and connect to the network will find their home dial-up passwords deleted.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Disable internal caching of passwords</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Run:</font> <pre><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">REGEDIT /s \\MY_PDC\netlogon\nocache.reg</font></pre> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">where "nocache.reg" consists of:</font> <pre><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"> REGEDIT4 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network] "DisablePwdCaching"=dword:00000001 </font></pre> </dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.3 How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under UNIX?</font></a></h2> <dd> <ol> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Do not install more services than you need. I installed everything on my RedHat Linux distribution and the machine lights up like a Xmas tree when port scanned. I already know of a few holes on that (test) machine that I can use to break in.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Use 'netstat' or a TCP/UDP scanner and '<tt>rpcinfo</tt>' to list all services on your machine. Again, make sure that everything you don't explicitly understand is turned off.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">(more forthcoming; frankly, I've been more of an WinNT admin lately so my skills are getting rusty)</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Read <a href="ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/papers/unix_security_checklist">ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/papers/unix_security_checklist</a>.</font></li> </ol> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Of course, you might want to consider upgrading the system. There are a large number of SunOS 4.x systems out there, for example, even though Sun stopped "officially" supporting it many years ago.</font> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.4 How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention under Macintosh?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Macintoshes are 'end-user' systems, and support few services that can be hacked. In comparison, Windows machines are more numerous, and UNIX machines have a lot more interesting (hackable) services running on them. Thus, Macintoshes are frequently not the target of intruders.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Beyond that, I know of nothing in particular.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.5"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.5 How do I increase intrusion detection/prevention for the enterprise?</font></a></h2> <dd> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">First and foremost, create a security policy. Let's say that you are watching the network late in the evening and you see an intrusion in-progress. What do you do? Do you let the intrusion progress and collect evidence? Do you pull the plug? If so, do you pull the plug on the firewall between the intra- and extra- net? Or do you take down the entire Internet connection (preventing users from getting to you web site)? Who has the authority to pull the plug?</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The priorities need to be set in place by the CEO of the corporation. Let's consider the scenario where you think you are being attacked, so you pull the plug. The users get up in arms, and complain. And, as it turns out, you were wrong, so your but gets fried. Even when blatant attacks are going on, few people pull the plug for fear of just such repercussions. Data theft is theoretical; ticked-off users are very real. Therefore, you need a policy from the very top that clearly states the importance of things and clearly lays out a procedure for what happens when an intrusion is suspected. [Author: does anybody have sample policies they can send me?]</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Once you have the priorities straight, you need to figure out the technology. That's described in the next section.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.6"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.6 How should I implement intrusion detection my enterprise?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Think about how you can configure the following systems in order to detect intruders:</font> <ol> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Operating Systems</b> such as WinNT and UNIX come with integrated logging/auditing features that can be used to monitor security critical resources. A section below discusses how to configure Windows and UNIX in order to enable intrusion detection.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Services</b>, such as web servers, email servers, and databases, include logging/auditing features as well. In addition, there are many tools that can be used to parse these files in order to discover intrusion signatures.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Network Intrusion Detection Systems</b> that watch network traffic in an attempt to discover intrusion attempts. A section below lists a number of these products.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Firewalls</b> usually have some network intrusion detection capabilities. After all, blocking intrusions is their primary purpose; it would be foolish not to detect intrusions as well.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>Network management platforms</b> (such as OpenView) have tools to help network managers set alerts on suspicious activity. At minimum, all SNMP devices should send "Authentication Failure" traps and management consoles should alert administrators when these go off.</font></li> </ol> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.7"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.7 What should I do when I've been hacked?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Read CERT's intruder detection checklist at <a target="_blank" href="ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist">ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist</a>.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">For the most part, a good response requires that you've set up good defensive measures in the first place. These include:</font> <dl> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">incident response team</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Set up an "incident response team". Identify those people who should be called whenever people suspect an intrusion in progress. The response team needs to be "inter-departmental", and include such people as:</font> <dl> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">upper management</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Need to identify somebody with the authority to handle escalated issues. For example, if the company has an online trading service, you need to identify somebody with enough power to "pull the plug". Going off-line on such a service will have a major impact -- but would still be better than hackers trading away people's stocks.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">HR (Human Resources)</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Many attacks come from internal employees. This consists of both serious attacks (cracking into machines) as well as nuisance attacks, such as browsing inappropriate servers looking for files like customer lists that might be left open.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">technical staff</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Security is often separate from normal MIS activity. If security personel detects a compromised system, they need to know who in MIS they need to call.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">outside members</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Identify people outside the company that may be contacted. This might be a local ISP person (for example, helping against smurf attacks), the local police, or the FBI. These aren't necessarily "formal" team members. They might not know anything about this, or they might simply be a "role" (like support@localisp.net). But put their names on the list so that everyone knows who to call.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">security team</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Of course, the most important team members will be the security people themselves.</font></dd> </dl> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Note that not all "team members" need to be involved with every incident. For example, you only need to ping upper management on serious attacks. They may never be called upon, but they do need to be identified, and they do need to be prepared as to the types of decisions they will have to make.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">response procedure</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Figure out guidelines now for the response action. For example, you need to decide now what your priorities are between network uptime and intrusion: can you pull the network plug whenever you strongly suspect intrusion? Do you want to allow continued intrusion in order to gather evidence against the intruder? Decide now, and get the CEO's approval now, because you won't have time during the attack.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">lines of communication</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Figure out guidelines for communication. Do you propagate the information up the corporate food chain from your boss up to the CEO, or horizontally to other business units? Do you take part in incident reporting organizations such as FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams) at <a target="_blank" href="http://www.first.org">http://www.first.org</a>? Do you inform the FBI or police? Do you notify partners (vendors/customers) that have a connection to your network (and who may be compromised, or from whom the attack originated)? Do you hide the intrusion from the press? Note that the FBI has a webpage for reporting crime at: <a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/reporting.htm">http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/reporting.htm</a></font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">logging procedures</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Set up your logging/auditing/monitoring procedures now; one of the most common thoughts after an attack is how much they wished they had adequate logging in the first place in order to figure out what happened.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">training/rehearsal</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Get training on all these issues. Each person involved needs to understand the scope of what they need to do. Also carry out dry runs. Assume a massive hacker penetration into your network, and drill what happens. Most hacker penetrations succeed because companies practice at being unprepared for their attack.</font></dd> </dl> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Since computer networks are growing so fast, there are not enough trained people to handle intrusions. Likewise, networks grow in an ad hoc fashion, so logging/auditing is haphazard. These conditions lead to the state that people don't know what to do when they've been attacked, and their networks aren't robust enough to recover well from the attack.</font> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.8"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.8 How should I respond when somebody tells me they've been hacked from my site?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">On the IDS mailing list, someone asked how they should respond to the following email:</font> <pre><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"> Below is a log showing a telnet connection from a machine within your domain. The machine it connected to does not offer this service publicly so this can only be assumed to be an IP space probe for vulnerable machines. We take this matter seriously, and hope that you will as well. Please take action on this issue as is appropriate and respond to this address with your actions. Nov 6 07:13:13 pbreton in.telnetd[31565]: refused connect from xx.xx.xx.xx </font></pre> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This log entry was likely generated by tcpwrappers, a facility that enhances logging and access control to services on UNIX. It shows an unauthorized attempt from your site to the specified machine. As claimed in the email message, it may be an automated sweep of some sort. The most popular protocols people sweep with are ICMP, FTP, SMTP, NNTP, and Telnet.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">In any case, this is evidence of a probe, not an attack. Furthermore, there is no other corroborating evidence. As pointed out by Greg Drew <gdrew at computer dot org> there could be a number of benign reasons:</font> <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Somebody typed "telnet xx.xx.xx.xx" and mistyped the IP address.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Somebody meant to type "telnet xx.xx.xx.xx 25" to connect to the STMP service in response to receiving spam from the site. The person might have forgotten the "25" or mistyped "23".</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Somebody might have actually done a more extensive scan on the target machines in response to spam. I've personally done light scans before (finger, rusers, etc.) to track down the source of spam.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">May have been an honest mistake (i.e. somebody used to have an account on that machine, but no longer does).</font></li> </ul> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">But there are also some nefarious possibilities:</font> <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Your site may have already been hacked, and the hacker is running scans from the compromised machine.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">One of your employees is using the machine to hack (I've worked at a company where this happened -- though since the company made protocol analyzers, it was kinda stupid and they were quickly detected).</font></li> </ul> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><vick at macdoon dot lerc dot nasa dot gov> pointed out another possibility: this might be a social engineering attack. The message asks (commands) you to contact them to describe what actions you have taken. If you do so, it will tell a lot about your network:</font> <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The target is a legal IP address (though not so interesting).</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Your IP address (the above message was likely sent to "postmaster" or some such well-known address, but you will likely respond using your own address.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Your readiness level: if you come back with a lame response (such as "we can't take action because we have no log files") then they know that your network is prime hacking territory.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This may be "social engineering spam". The sender of the message may be a company looking to resell intrusion detection products.</font></li> </ul> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Like responding to spam, there is probably little good that can come about responding to this email message (unless you find evidence that some hacker has been using your network as a stepping stone). It probably would be a good idea to check you system logs for the data/time in question, and if you don't have logs, now might be a good time to turn logging on.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><b>As it turns out, the incident was benign.</b> The target network had reconfigured itself, and the "unauthorized" user didn't know about it yet, and wasn't logging in correctly.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="3.9"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">3.9 How do I collect enough evidence about the hacker?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">An interesting field of IDS is collecting enough information about the incident to identify the hacker. This can be very hard because truely elite hackers will be bouncing their attacks from another compromised system. Hackers will also often employ IP address spoofing, which may appear as if attacks are coming from machines that aren't even turned on.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">As far as I can tell, the best technique is to collect as much information as you can. For example, I've put a packet sniffer capturing to tracefiles on our T-1 line saving to files on a 16-gigabyte disk (most any sniffing programme on most platforms can do this). You may not think it fun, but I enjoy perusing these files. It's amazing how many TCP/UDP scans and other probes I see on a regular basis.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Likewise, you should make sure you have full auditing and logging enabled on any/all systems exposed to the Internet. These will help you figure out what happened when you were hacked.</font> <p> </p> <dt>  <h1><a name="4."><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4. Products</font></a></h1> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This section discusses the major network IDS products.</font> <dt>  <h2><a name="4.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.1 What freeware/shareware intrusion detection systems are available?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The most complete list on the net seams to be the <i>COAST Intrusion Detection System Resources page</i> at <a href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/ids">http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/ids</a>.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">See sections 4.4 and 4.5 below for a discussion of some freeware technologies.</font></p> <dt>  <h2><a name="4.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2 What commercial intrusion detection systems are available?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Note: I've removed the table of info because it has gotten dangerously out-of-date</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Reviews can be found at:</font> <ul> <li><a href="http://www.nwc.com/1023/1023f19.html"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">http://www.nwc.com/1023/1023f19.html</font></a></li> </ul> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Several of these have comments from the vendors themselves that they emailed me. Also note that this information can quickly become out of date. The industry has gone through several major changes since I started this document.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The site <a href="http://www.internations.net/uk/talisker/">http://www.internations.net/uk/talisker/</a> has done a good job of wading through the marketing hype and pulling out the salient points about each of the commercial products.</font> <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.0"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.0 BlackICE by Network ICE</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Vendor comments:</font> <blockquote> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">BlackICE has multiple versions. The core is built around "BlackICE Sentry", a full network-based intrusion detection system. There are also host/hybrid versions that run on Windows desktops with a built-in personal firewall.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The list of intrusions it detects is at: <a href="http://www.networkice.com/advICE/Intrusions">http://www.networkice.com/advICE/Intrusions</a></font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Distinguishing features of BlackICE Sentry are:</font> <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Full 7-layer, stateful, protocol analysis</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Anti-evasion techniques (handles fragmentation, whisker scans, a whole suite of signature changing attacks)</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Extremely fast, easily handles full 100-mbps bandwidth.</font></li> </ul> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Goto <a href="http://www.networkice.com">http://www.networkice.com</a> for more information.</font></p> </blockquote> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.1 CyberCop Monitor by Network Associates, Inc.</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Vendor comments:</font> <blockquote> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CyberCop Monitor is a hybrid host/network based IDS that analyzes network traffic to and from the host as well as Windows NT EventLog audit trails and Windows NT authentication activity.</font> <p>  <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Developed under the Microsoft Management Console user interface, both CyberCop Monitor and the SMI Console integrate to provide an easy to use graphical interface for local / remote reporting, and remote installation.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Configuration editor allows for custom settings and thresholds to suit every environment, including security profiles, account groups, time and subnets.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Extensive filtering using ordered filter rules for each signature.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Report coalescing feature suppresses denial of service on the IDS itself.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Report collating of monitoring and scanning information per system with trend analysis options, including 3D charting and graphing from an SQL database.</font></li> </ul> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Goto <<a href="http://www.nai.com">http://www.nai.com</a>> for more information.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">CyberCop Monitor was written from the ground up by NAI. There is NO connection with the CyberCop Network v.1.0 product developed by Network General/WheelGroup or the Haystack product from TIS - This was aging technology and shelved some months after each subsequent acquisition.</font></p> </blockquote> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.2 RealSecure by Internet Security Systems (ISS), Inc.</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Vendor comments:</font> <blockquote> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Internet Security Systems is the first and only company that has tied both intrusion detection (ISS RealSecure) and vulnerability detection (ISS Internet Scanner) into an integrated security platform for organization to help plan, analyze, and manage their security on a continuous basis. ISS RealSecure is a component of ISS SAFEsuite family of products that cover managing security risk across the enterprise. ISS RealSecure is the market-leader in Intrusion Detection with an integrated host and network based solution. ISS RealSecure comes with over 400 attack signatures with the ability for customers in both the network and host based solution to add or modify their own signatures.</font> </blockquote> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.3 NetRanger by WheelGroup/Cisco</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Originally by Wheelgroup, bought by Cisco. It has been recently renamed, though I'm not sure to what. Goto <a href="http://www.wheelgroup.com">http://www.wheelgroup.com</a>.</font> <dt>  <h3><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><a name="4.2.4">4.2.4</a> eTrust Intrusion Detection by Computer Associates</font></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Formerly Memco/Abirnet/PLATINUM SessionWall, this is now owned by Computer Associates and marketed as <i>eTrust Intrusion Detection</i>.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Goto <a href="http://www.cai.com/solutions/enterprise/etrust/intrusion_detection">http://www.cai.com/solutions/enterprise/etrust/intrusion_detection</a>.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Originally, SessionWall started out as more of a firewall/content-inspection platform that interposed itself in the stream of traffic. I'm not sure where it is now.</font></p> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.6"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.6 NetProwler by Axent</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Goto <a href="http://www.axent.com">http://www.axent.com</a>.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.7"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.7 Centrax by Cybersafe</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Goto <a href="http://www.cybersafe.com/solutions/centrax.html">http://www.cybersafe.com/solutions/centrax.html</a>.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.9"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.9 NFR by Network Flight Recorder</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Vendor comments:</font> <blockquote> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">NFR is available in multiple forms: a freeware/research version (see below), the "NFR Intrusion Detection Appliance" which comes as bootable CD-ROM, and bundles from 3rd party resellers that add their own features on top of it (like Anzen).</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">One of the popular features of NFR is "N-code", a fully featured programming language optimized for intrusion detection style capabilities. They have a fulll SMTP parser written in the N-code. Most other systems have either simply add signatures or force you to use raw C programming. Numerous N-code scripts are downloadable from the Internet from sources such as L0pht.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">NFR does more statistical analysis than other systems. The N-code system allows easy additions into this generic statistical machine.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A general description can be found at <a href="http://www.nfr.net/forum/publications/LISA-97.htm">http://www.nfr.net/forum/publications/LISA-97.htm</a></font></p> </blockquote> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.2.10"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.2.10 Dragon by Security Wizards</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Goto <a href="http://www.network-defence.com">http://www.network-defense.com</a></font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="4.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.3 What is a "network grep" system?</font></a></h2> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A "network grep" system is based around <a href="http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html">raw packet capture</a> pumped through a "regular expression" parser that finds patterns in the network traffic. An example pattern would be: "<tt>/cgi-bin/phf</tt>", which would indicate an attempt to exploit the vulnerable CGI script called "phf". Once building such a system, you would then analyze well-known attacks, extract strings specific to those attacks, and add them to your databse of patterns. See <a href="http://www.packetfactory.net/ngrep/">http://www.packetfactory.net/ngrep/</a> for an example.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">"Regexp" (regular expression) is a common pattern-matching language in the UNIX environment. While it has traditionally been used for searching text files, it can also be used for arbitrary binary data. In truth, such systems have more flexible matching criteria, such as finding ports or matching TCP flags.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">"libpcap" (library for packet capture) is a common library available for UNIX systems that "sniffs" packets off a wire. Most UNIX-based intrusion detection systems (of any kind) use libpcap, though many also have optimized drivers for a small subset of platforms.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The source code for both modules is freely available. A large number of intrusion detection systems simply feed the output of libpcap (or tcpdump) into the regular expression parse, where the expressions come from a file on the disk. Some even simpler systems don't even use regular expressions and simply compare packets with well-known byte patterns. If you want to build a system like this yourself, read up on 'tcpdump' and regular expressions. To understand libpcap/tcpdump, the following document will be helpful: <a href="http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html">http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffing-faq.html</a>.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">This class of intrusion detection system has one advantage: it is the easiest to update. Products of this class will consistently have the largest number of "signatures" and be the fastest time-to-market for detecting new popular attack "scripts".</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">However, while such systems may bost the largest number of "signatures", they detect the fewest number of "serious" intrusions. For example, the 8 bytes "CE63D1D2 16E713CF" when seen at the start of UDP data indicates Back Orifice traffic with the default password. Even though 80% of Back Orifice attacks use the default password, the other 20% use different passwords and would not be detected by the system. For example, changing the Back Orifice password to "evade" would change the pattern to "8E42A52C 0666BC4A", and would go undetected by "network grep" systems.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Some of these systems do not reassemble IP datagrams or TCP streams. Again, a hacker could simply reconfigure the MTU size on the machine in order to evade regexp-pcap systems.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Such systems result in larger numbers of false positives. In the BackOrifice example above, the 64-bit pattern is not so uncommon that it won't be seen in other traffic. This will cause alarms to go off even when no Back Orifice is present.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Systems based upon protocol analysis do not have these problems. They catch all instances of the attack, not just the common varieties; they result in fewer false positives; and they often are able to run faster because a protocol decode doesn't have to "search" a frame. They are also able to more fully diagnose the problem; for example distinguish between a "Back Orifice PING" (which is harmless) and a "Back Orifice compromise" (which is an extreme condition). On the other hand, it can often take a week to add a new protocol analysis signature (rather than hours) due to the design and testing involved. Also, overly-agressive attempts to reduce false positives also leads to missing real attacks in some cases.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">However, such systems have an advantage over protocol analysis systems. Because they do not have pre-conceived notion about what network traffic is supposed to look like, they can often detect attacks that other systems might miss. For example, if a company is running a POP3 server on a different port, it is likely that protocol analysis systems will not recognize the traffic as POP3. Therefore, any attacks against the port will go undetected. On the other hand, a network-grep style system doesn't necessarily care about port numbers and will check for the same signatures regardless of ports.</font> <p>  <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.3.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.3.1 Dragon</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">See above.</font> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.3.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.3.2 Bro</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Vern Paxson's Bro intrusion detection system. Vern Paxson wrote large portions of libpcap that many other intrusion detection systems are based on (like NFR and Dragon). I haven't heard of anyone actually using Bro itself. Read the paper <a href="http://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/bro-usenix98-revised.ps.Z">http://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/bro-usenix98-revised.ps.Z</a> for more information.</font> <dt>  <h3><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"><a name="4.3.3">4.3.3</a> <a name="snort">Snort</a></font></h3> <dd><a href="http://www.clark.net/~roesch/security.html"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">http://www.clark.net/~roesch/security.html</font></a> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Snort has recently become very popular, and is considered really cool by a lot of people. It contains over 100 of its own signatures, and others can be found on the Internet.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Following is an example rule:</font> <pre><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3"> # here's an example of PHF attack detection where just a straight text string # is searched for in the app layer alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 80 (msg:"PHF attempt"; content:"/cgi-bin/phf";) </font></pre> <font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">It says to alert an a TCP connection from any IP address and any port to the 192.168.1.x subnet to port 80. It searches for the content "/cgi-bin/phf" anywhere in the content. If it find such content, it will alert the console with a message "PHF attempt".</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Usage of snort is usually done in the following manner:</font> <ul> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">BPF filters (part of libpcap) are configured to narrow down the focus to cetain types of traffic.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">A decision is made about which IP addresses are internal and which are external to further narrow down the focus.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Rules are edited to fit the local environment.</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">System runs</font> <li><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Rules are further edited to remove false positives.</font></li> </ul> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Also, snort has a number of options to be used just to sniff network traffic.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Rules:</font> <ul> <li><a href="http://snort.rapidnet.com/"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">http://snort.rapidnet.com/</font></a> <li><a href="http://www.whitehats.com"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">http://www.whitehats.com</font></a></li> </ul> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.3.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.3.4 Argus</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Argus isn't an intrusion detection system itself. However, it monitors packets off the wire and generates logfile events. You can then process those log entries (or peruse them yourself) to find intrusions.</font> <p><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">See <a href="ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/argus">ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/argus</a> for more info. Also see <a href="ftp://ftp.sei.cmu.edu/pub/argus-1.5">ftp://ftp.sei.cmu.edu/pub/argus-1.5</a></font></p> </dd> </dl> <dt>  <h2><a name="4.4"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.4 What tools do intruders use to break into my systems?</font></a></h2> <dd> <dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.4.1"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.4.1 UNIX utilities</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">These utilities either come with your favorite UNIX platform or you can download them for free.</font> <dl> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">ping</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">to see if a host is alive.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">traceroute</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">to find the route to the host</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">nslookup/dig</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">to discover all your DNS information</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">whois</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">finds out Internic registration information</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">finger</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">finds out who is logged in and info about users</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">rpcinfo</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">finds out what RPC services are running</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">showmount</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">display shares on a machine</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">SAMBA</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">displays info about WinNT SMB shares</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">telnet</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">the granddaddy of them all -- allows you to connect and play with any text-based protocol (HTTP, FTP, SMTP, etc.)</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.4.2"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.4.2 WinNT utilities</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">All of the UNIX utilities mentioned above can be used with WinNT. There are also some WinNT specific ones.</font> <dl> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">nbtstat</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">discovers NetBIOS information on remote machine</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">net view</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">is the LANMAN programme that allows you to remotely view WinNT shares</font></dd> </dl> <dt>  <h3><a name="4.4.3"><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">4.4.3 Hacking-specific utilities</font></a></h3> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">The standard toolkit for a intruder.</font> <dl> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">netcat</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">is characterized as a "TCP/IP" Swiss Army Knife, allows intruders to script protocol interactions, especially text-based protocols.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">crack / NTcrack / L0phtCrack / etc.</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">that crack network passwords (Dictionary or Brute Force). These packages also contain utilities for dumping passwords out of databases and sniffing them off the wire.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Sniffing utilities</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">for watching raw network traffic, such as <b>Gobbler</b>, <b>tcpdump</b>, or even an honest-to-god Network Associates <b>Sniffer© Network Analyzer</b></font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">TCP and UDP port scanners</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">for scanning/strobing/probing which TCP ports are available. TCP port-scanners can also run in a number of stealth modes to evade/elude loggers.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Ping sweepers</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">for pinging large numbers of machines to see which ones are active.</font> <dt><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">Exploit packs</font> <dd><font face="MS Sans Serif" size="3">which are a set of one or more programs that know how to exploit holes on systems (usually, once the user is logged in).</font> <dt><font face=